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Law Reform Agenda as ALI
Approaches Its Centennial
“RESTATEMENT OF…” SYMPOSIUM AFTERWORD
Lance Liebman†
The American Law Institute and I are happy and proud
that the Brooklyn Law School and its Law Review chose to hold
an important conference about ALI work, to persuade such an
outstanding group of scholars to write such varied and
interesting papers, and now to publish their work. I am
especially happy because, as I near the end of my service as ALI
Director, these papers give me an opportunity to reflect on the
projects, perfect and imperfect, that the ALI accomplished (or
attempted and failed to accomplish) in our effort to improve the
American legal system.
When I was asked to succeed Geoff Hazard and become
the fifth ALI Director in 1999, I had already enjoyed a long
relationship with the Institute. I had been engaged as a
member for more than 20 years, had attended several annual
meetings, and had played a minor role as a Reporter on the
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury project. As the new
Director, I started learning a great deal about this organization
and rather quickly saw three overriding themes: how the ALI
should pick its new projects, the ALI’s process for recommending
law reform, and to what extent the ALI should go international.
Now, when I can look back at what will be my 15-year tenure as
director—the same length as Geoff’s, but shorter than the
directorships of William Draper Lewis, Judge Herbert
Goodrich, and Herb Wechsler—these still seem to be the
challenging issues for my successor. And each of them gets
serious attention from the articles in this symposium. The ALI
leadership, including President Roberta Ramo and Deputy

† Director, American Law Institute, 1999–2014; William S. Beinecke
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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Director Stephanie Middleton, will get helpful ideas and
warnings from these articles, but the issues will remain alive.
I.

WHAT SUBJECTS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR ALI PROJECTS?

Like that of some religions, cults, and cabals, the ALI’s
existence and work revolve around a single, but nebulous,
word; in our case, Restatement. I remain astonished that our
founders used that word and am equally astonished that it has
been applied to so many different ways of recommending
improved legal principles. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
We think that the time has come to study critically these rules which
we have so clearly stated. Such a study should indicate (1) what
rules are founded upon historical accident, misconception of other
cases and the like; (2) what rules are unjustified by any principle of
justice, but are unimportant or harmless and may be left as they are
because of the desirability of certainty; (3) what rules are
unsupportable in principle and evil in action; (4) what rules are
functionally or otherwise desirable, but have been established upon
grounds that are unsound or inapplicable and which may lead in
later cases to erroneous or unjust applications of the rule.1

Professor Wechsler supplied his thoughts about ALI
recommendations that have no support in current law:
I pointed out that the official statements in our records always have
affirmed some scope for such a judgment and suggested as a working
formula we should feel obliged in our deliberations to give weight to
all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the
judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs.2

He later pronounced:
In judging what was “right,” a preponderating balance of authority
would normally be given weight, as it no doubt would generally
weigh with courts, but it has not been thought to be conclusive. And
when the Institute’s adoption of the view of a minority of courts has
helped to shift the balance of authority, it is quite clear that this has
been regarded as a vindication of our judgment and a proper cause
for exultation.3

Some ALI work identifies general statements of law in the
decisions of appellate courts. Some work reports disagreements
1 A.L.I., REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FUTURE PROGRAM 304
(submitted to the ALI Council, Mar. 18, 1947).
2 Herbert Wechsler, Report of the Director to the ALI Membership, 1966
A.L.I. ANN. REP. 5.
3 Herbert Wechsler, Report of the Director to the ALI Membership, 1967
A.L.I. ANN. REP. 6.
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about legal doctrine and explains why a doctrinal position, one
not necessarily endorsed by a majority of states or courts, is the
right one. Some work goes outside and beyond what courts now
do. Two extreme positions are both wrong: that law is permanent
and can be found in the heavens; and that the ALI can sit in a
dark room (actually, our meeting room has been reconstructed to
let in natural light) and simply invent doctrine without paying
attention to what occurs in the real world of law.
In 1947, with a substantial portion of appropriate
Restatement topics complete, Judge Learned Hand’s committee
recommended moving toward statutory drafting. Results of this
expansion of the ALI’s agenda included the Model Penal Code
and (in partnership with the organization now called the
Uniform Law Commission) the Uniform Commercial Code.
Later came work on corporate governance, a project hard to call
a Restatement (though perhaps it should have been) because it
was making recommendations to Delaware and other state
courts, to federal courts, to Congress, and to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The work was called Principles of
Corporate Governance. Soon after came work on family law
called Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, a fancy title
that fit because it covered the legal consequences of separations
between unmarried pairs of adults as well as conventional
divorces. During my years as ALI Director, the Institute
characterized about half of its ongoing projects as Principles and
the other half as Restatements. Despite the different naming
conventions, it is hard to see a difference in methodology
between, for example, the Principles of the Law of Liability
Insurance and the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration. It seems clear that the word
Restatement attracts more attention and citations, so perhaps the
next ALI Director will call all ALI projects Restatements. We
are, for example, thinking about a title like Restatement of the
Principles of Privacy Law for one of our newest projects.
Nothing is more challenging for the ALI than starting
and completing the right projects. A subject of law must be
substantial enough to need several years of intellectual effort to
distill it into principles. It must be worthy of review by Advisers
who are judges, practicing lawyers, and academics. It must
support interesting and constructive debate by the ALI Council
and at annual meetings of the ALI membership. And finally, it
must be capable of being debated without descending into
political dust-ups. The goal is work that benefits lawyers and
judges, whether or not they are persuaded by every sentence.
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All of this is relevant to the articles in this issue of the
Brooklyn Law Review. Authors here have focused on 14 individual
subjects of law and have explored whether a subject of law is right
for restatement.
A.

Areas of Law

Some of the ALI’s early achievement was accomplished
by putting law into boxes where a subject could be considered.
Susan Appleton says children and the law is ready to be
analyzed and not just considered as a subset of family law.4
Marci Hamilton urges work on child sex abuse.5 Presumably,
that work might attach to or connect with our current work on
Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault Crimes and the possible
project on children and the law recommended by Professor
Appleton. Dan Tarlock says there is no such thing as
environmental law.6 Ann Bartow writes that copyright law could
be summarized better by the ALI than by Professor Nimmer and
the formulations in his treatise.7 Ian Bartrum does not think
religion is a proper ALI subject.8 Instead, he points in interesting
ways to places such as Servitudes and Family Dissolution, where
the Reporters offer limited formulations of doctrinal statements
about religion’s relevance.9 Professors Joslin and Levine take a
similar position about laws concerning LGBT people: issues
concerning gays and lesbians should be noticed in a wide group
of ALI projects, but should not be taken up as a separate lawreform endeavor.10 David Orentlicher does an amazing job in
describing issues for a health law Restatement in a mere 22
pages.11 Perhaps the most general and intellectually stimulating
analysis is Larry Solan’s Socratic debate about the possible
pluses and minuses of creating a Restatement of Statutory
Interpretation, a work recommended by Gary O’Connor 10
See Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 525 (2014).
See Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a Restatement of Child Sex
Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397 (2014).
6 See Dan Tarlock, Why There Should Be No Restatement of Environmental
Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 663, 663-64 (2014).
7 See Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and
Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2014).
8 See Ian Bartrum, Religion and the Restatements, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 579,
579-80 (2014).
9 See id. at 582-84.
10 See Courtney G. Joslin & Lawrence C. Levine, The Restatement of Gay(?),
79 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 621-22 (2014).
11 See David Orentlicher, A Restatement of Health Care Law, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 435 (2014).
4
5
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years ago. At the end, Larry says no: such a Restatement
“cannot help and may do harm.” He draws on the lack of
influence of certain sections of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts to conclude that statutory interpretation is about
hard cases and that judges would simply cite general
statements about interpretation from a Restatement to explain
results that would not in fact be influenced by the ALI’s work.
My friends Tom Merrill and Henry Smith present a
completely convincing analysis of why the Restatements of
Property have had so much less influence than the Restatements
of Torts and Contracts.12 As a professor of property law, I agree
with Tom and Henry that some of the property work was not the
highest quality ALI accomplishment, but I also see two other
explanations. One is that property law is much more a matter of
individual state doctrine and practice than torts or contracts. A
second explanation relates to a matter that has divided property
professors for at least two decades: Is there property law or is
property the application of the laws of tort, contract, agency,
restitution, and other subjects to particular subfields? Professors
Merrill and Smith are leaders in the intellectual movement to
declare that there are in fact principles of property law. I, as
with so many other legal questions, see more than one side of
this argument. Certainly, it is a challenging task to identify
themes, much less principles, that apply to and govern
landlord–tenant law, the law of wills and trusts, zoning law,
patent law, water law, the constitutional law of takings and
eminent domain, and at least half a dozen other subjects
squeezed into a one-semester, first-year law course.
B.

Influence Outside of Common Law

Then come questions of how political a subject is and
how much influence the ALI will have. Can an organization
like the ALI actually come to a consensus, and can it persuade
readers that the work it produces is balanced and fair? This
subject is discussed well in Larry Zelenak’s article on federal
income tax law. Larry shows that the ALI did intellectually
excellent work on this subject matter but did not immediately
persuade Congress.13 Similar questions have arisen when we

12 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle? The
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014).
13 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Almost-Restatement of Income Tax of 1954:
When Tax Giants Roamed the Earth, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 709 (2014).
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have discussed whether the ALI could have influence if it
undertook work on federal or state administrative law.
I most like articles that say a subject IS appropriate for
ALI work. (I do not mean that Dan Tarlock is wrong in saying
no to an ALI project on environmental law. He argues well that
the U.S. has no coherent environmental law to restate.14) On
the other hand, Ronald Krotoszynski makes an excellent case
for privacy law, a subject on which we have begun work.15
Professor Krotoszynski is certain that a project on privacy
should cover both government and private-sector relationships
to information that has traditionally been seen as private.16 He
is also convinced that national boundaries cannot surround
effective privacy protections.17 He does not ask how an
organization with “American” as its first name can tell the
world what privacy means in this electronic era.18
Ned Foley and Steve Huefner describe an ALI project
now underway: the Principles of Election Law.19 As they say, a
challenging issue with this project is identifying what to cover
and what not to cover.20 This concern is guided by where the
political context might permit ALI work to have influence. At
the outer bounds of an imaginable ALI undertaking, Mae
Kuykendall attempts to find ways for the ALI to make
principled statements about the law of “place.”21 She is right,
for example, that our lives have changed in many ways: that
automobility can take us great distances, that an office in a
skyscraper is not on the street, and that the difference between
“work” and “non-work” is no longer whether we are at the
factory or the office.22 She is also right that the historic role of
geography in determining sovereignty, and thus telling us what
agency has the authority to impose law, is in flux.23

See Tarlock, supra note 6, at 664.
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Prolegomenon to Any Future
Restatement of Privacy, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 505 (2014).
16 See id. at 511.
17 See id. at 512; see also Mae Kuykendall, Restatement of Place, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 757 (2014).
18 See Krotoszynski, supra note 15, at 513.
19 See Steven F. Huefner & Edward B. Foley, The Judicialization of Politics: The
Challenge of the ALI Principles of Election Law Project, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 551 (2014).
20 Id. at 577.
21 See Kuykendall, supra note 17, at 757.
22 Id. at 773.
23 Id. at 759. For an example of this struggle, see the attempt by the Supreme
Court of the United States to keep “place” important in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). Observe also the relationship of “place” to what law
determines who is married to whom and when. See Kuykendall, supra note 17.
14
15

2014]

C.

AFTERWORD: RESTATEMENT OF . . .

827

Internal Consistency

Keeping consistency in ALI work is important, but it
can never be achieved to perfection. Sometimes, a legal rule
looks different in the context of one legal subject than it does in
another subject. Professor Bartrum shows inconsistency
between the treatment of religion in the trusts and wills
Restatements.24 Similarly, Professors Joslin and Levine discuss
in detail how the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
meets their standards for appropriate consideration of the legal
consequences of unmarried partnerships and how the
Restatement (Third) of Torts on certain issues (for example the
emotional harm from seeing a loved one injured) does not offer
what they regard as correct and fair legal doctrines.25
Or sometimes we are just imperfect. We miss things and
do not persuade our Reporters to come to an agreement. On the
other hand, sometimes our process resolves an inconsistency. The
best example during my Directorship was when Andrew Kull,
from his grounding in the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment, persuaded the membership to require Lawrence
Waggoner and John Langbein, the Reporters for wills and other
donative transfer, to alter their recommendation that a murderer
be able to inherit from his or her victim. Indeed, could there be a
more unjust enrichment than that?
II.

IS OUR PROCESS A GOOD ONE?

Keith Hylton’s article explains his view that
Restatements are not an efficient form of legal evolution.26 He
gives a number of reasons why several dozen judges, lawyers,
and professors in a room will not necessarily approve efficient
and fair legal rules.27 His preference is for a diversity of state
courts to address questions as they see cases, and either apply
traditional doctrine or decide that this is the time to change
common law rules. In this way, Keith says that the judicial
orchestra can gradually accomplish progressive evolution of the
law.28 I am of course biased, but my main response to Keith is

See Bartrum, supra note 8, at 585.
See Joslin & Levine, supra note 10, at 647-49.
26 See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common
Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 595 (2014).
27 See id. at 601.
28 See id. at 618.
24
25
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that the ALI has no official authority.29 That is why I have slept
so well for the past 14 years. You will not be surprised when I
write that Keith has not persuaded me that the process of
judicial application and adaptation of law—the common law
process—is harmed in any way by the authoring and offering
up merely as recommendations the consequences of a careful
ALI process of doctrinal reconsideration.
An ALI rule tells members to “leave their clients at the
door,” and it is a point of honor among members that they state
what they personally believe to be right, not what their clients
want them to say. But it is equally important that the ALI
make certain that all significant points of view are represented
and explained. The Principles of Corporate Governance had
noisy problems of participants apparently speaking for their
clients. The ALI’s leadership, especially President Rod Perkins,
fought the battle and was able to achieve a balanced product
that has had influence. But leaving clients at the door is not
the same as denying entrance to judges who have written
opinions taking a position on a question of legal doctrine, to
professors who have published their views or been expert
witnesses, and not even to practicing lawyers who represent
clients with positions. We want these individuals in the room
so long as they are transparent about their views and clients.30
And often we can get a result that is somewhere between the
extreme positions of those who litigate the cases. We hope that
finding this middle ground will be helpful for judges who must
make decisions about the right legal rule.

29 But see Arizona, which—by its state supreme court precedent—follows the
Restatements on any matter where there is no statute or case law to the contrary. The
same policy of adopting Restatements as law exists in the U.S. Virgin Islands, the
Republic of Palau, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, which have
all enacted statutes to that effect. In Pennsylvania it is clear that the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS has been adopted, but the federal and state courts there disagree whether the
RESTATEMENT SECOND or RESTATEMENT THIRD governs products liability cases because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not specifically adopted the RESTATEMENT THIRD.
30 Apparently, when the National Academy of Sciences provides scholarly
advice to the FDA and other policy makers, it does not permit scientists paid by drug
companies to participate. See Elizabeth Laposata, Richard Barnes & Stanton
Glantz, Tobacco Industry Influence on the American Law Institute’s Restatements of
Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1, 54-59
(2012). At the ALI, I do not believe we could do our work or have all the necessary
information without having experienced legal practitioners engaged in our process.
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SHOULD OUR PROJECTS GO BEYOND DOMESTIC LAW?

Some ALI work is about American law as it applies to or
is affected by international subjects and international law.31
Some work is recommended to the U.S. as well as to other
countries: the Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure;
Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles of Cooperation
(first offered to Mexico, Canada, and the U.S., but now to the
world); Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction,
Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes, and
Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law. Professor
Louis Henkin’s magisterial Restatement Third: The Foreign
Relations Law of the United States recommended domestic law
about international matters. His work also laid out principles
of international law with, effectively, a recommendation that
they be followed by U.S. courts, by domestic courts in other
countries, and by international courts and international
agencies including the United Nations.
How much of the ALI’s work should go beyond domestic
law is now an important question. For sure, we have begun
Restatement Fourth: Foreign Relations Law. We began with
analysis of three subjects: sovereign immunity, jurisdiction and
enforcement, and treaties. We have many distinguished nonAmericans in our group of Reporters, Counselors, and Advisers,
and we must decide over time to what extent the project should
address matters usually thought of as questions of
international law.
CONCLUSION
Before getting the helpful guidance from the authors
represented in this issue, we have moved forward on a number of
new ALI projects. Ongoing projects include those on employment
law, international commercial arbitration, criminal sentencing,
the law of nonprofit organizations, and liability insurance. We
have recently begun work on privacy, Indian law, consumer
contracts, sexual assault crimes, election law, the law of
government ethics, foreign relations law, and two torts subjects:
intentional torts and economic harm.

31 E.g., Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE U.S. LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at xi (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2013); A.L.I.,
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED
FEDERAL STATUTE 7-27 (2006).
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To me, the most innovative and perhaps therefore the
most challenging new project is Indian law. In some ways, the
subject begins with decisions by Chief Justice Marshall early in
the 19th Century. The United States has a national government
and 50 states. The country also has tribes with a degree of
sovereignty that descends from treaties. The articles in this law
review issue raise valid questions about the sorts of law reform
that the ALI can influence. Indian law is constitutional law, the
law of federal–state relations, and federal statutory law; all areas
surrounded by signs that say “ALI: Be Careful.” Yet Reporter
Matthew Fletcher and his two colleagues have put out early
drafts and have led initial meetings that have been serious and
productive. As of today, I am cautiously optimistic that the ALI
can do first-class work that will be good for a nation and for the
descendants of those who were here before the Europeans,
Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans arrived.
To repeat my opening words, nothing is more challenging
for the American Law Institute—the most significant private
law-reform organization in the world—than identifying,
starting, and completing the right projects. The articles in this
issue have taught me a great deal and will help my successor as
the new Director. The organization remains significant entering
its 91st year. Onward!

